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CERCLA DEFENDANTS: THE PROBLEM OF
EXPANDING LIABILITY AND DIMINISHING
DEFENSES
I. INTRODUCTION
Late in 1980 Congress responded to the expensive problem of haz-
ardous waste cleanup by passing the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),1 commonly
referred to as the Superfund.2 Although the legislative history of CER-
CLA is somewhat vague and confusing,' courts recognize two overrid-
ing goals behind its passage.4 First, Congress intended that the federal
government have the power and money to promptly and effectively re-
spond to the national problem of hazardous waste disposal.5 Second,
Congress intended that those parties responsible for the hazardous
waste problem pay for its cleanup.6 To meet these goals, Congress es-
tablished7 and the courts instituted8 a system of defining responsible
parties and imposing appropriate remedial costs.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. For an overview of CERCLA, see Macbeth & Mayer, An Introduction to
Superfund, 30 PRAC. LAW. 53 (1984).
3. The vagueness and confusion resulted because Congress enacted the legislation
hurriedly. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
S111 (D. Minn. 1982). See also Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
(1982).
4. See, e.g., Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
5. See United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 903 (D.N.H. 1985); Pinole Point
Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Reilly
Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
6. See Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at 903; Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 287;
Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (1982) provide tools for government cleanup. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 provides for a system of liability so that those responsible for the particular
hazardous waste problem will pay for the cleanup.
8. Courts have interpreted the statute to impose strict liability. See Giblin & Kelly,
Judicial Development of Standards of Liability in Government Enforcement Action
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 33
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1, 11-13 (1984-85).
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CERCLA provides a mechanism for governmental or private
cleanup of hazardous wastes.9 The Act establishes a system of liabil-
ity10 to shift the costs of cleanup to certain defined parties." Either the
government agency cleaning up the waste or a private party complying
with certain requirements12 may bring a cause of action. This Recent
9. See Note, Joint and Several Liability under CERCLA-United States v. Chem-
Dyne Corp., 57 TEMPLE L.Q. 885 (1984).
10. Section 107 contains the heart of the liability provisions, stating that certain
persons shall be liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States' Gov-
ernment or a state not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan, (B) any
other necessary costs incurred by any other person consistent with the National
Contingency Plan, and (C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of national
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or
loss resulting from such release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(C) (1982).
The standard of liability imposed is strict liability. See United States v. Price, 577 F.
Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983) (imposing strict liability on a past, nonnegligent off-state gen-
erator for hazardous waste). Although the language "joint and severally liable" was
deleted from the statute, the courts have read the language back in. See, e.g., United
States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that Congress
intended the courts to impose common law liability rules and that this did not preclude
imposition of joint and several liability); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326(E.D. Pa 1983) (holding that the federal courts are justified in developing common law
on scope of liability and that joint and several liability should be imposed unless defend-
ants established that a reasonable basis exists for apportioning the harm among them).
11. See infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the potential
classes of CERCLA defendants under § 107(a)(1)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4)
(1982).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) provides for a private cause of action. See Bulk Dis-
trib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Pinole
Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 289; Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy,
Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515, 515-17 (D. Mass. 1983).
In order for a private party to file a suit, a release of a reportable quantity of hazard-
ous substance must occur. Subsequently, the private party must make a demand for
recovery of costs incurred in cleaning up the spill, and must wait sixty days for satisfac-
tion of the demand. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a).
The plaintiff must establish two facts to bring a private cause of action under
§ 107(a)(4)(B). First, he must show that the cleanup is consistent with the National
Contingency Plan. See Pinole Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 290; United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823, 850-51
(W.D. Mo. 1984); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 303-04 (N.D.N.Y.
1984). The plaintiff does not need to prove preauthorization by the government. Pinole
Point Properties, 596 F. Supp. at 290.
A second prerequisite is a showing by the plaintiff of some cleanup cost. A & F
Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. at 1254. The plaintiff need not show complete cleanup of
the site. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984). The EPA
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Development will first explore the various actions13 that expose a party
to CERCLA liability.14 Second, this paper will examine the extent of
the potential liability. Third, the statutory affirmative defenses that a
defendant may assert will be investigated. Finally, the ability of a de-
fendant to decrease any damage awards against him, through appor-
tionment, will be explored.
II. POTENTIALLY LIABLE PARTIES
A. A Statutory Overview
CERCLA specifically imposes liability for cleanup costs15 on the
owner or operator of a site,16 a prior owner or operator at the time of
the hazardous waste disposal, 7 those who arranged for waste disposal
or treatment at the site,18 and any transporter of the hazardous
waste. 19 Courts interpret this statutory language to implicitly impose
liability on a number of other parties.
B. Generators and Transporters
CERCLA makes parties who generate or transport hazardous
wastes found at existing dumpsites liable for their cleanup costs.
20
This liability applies retroactively to reach all past and present genera-
has stated that cost recovery actions should, however, follow a partial or completed
cleanup.
13. Two commentators suggest that a party does not need to take any action to
incur CERCLA liability. See Angelo & Bergeson, The Expanding Scope of Liability for
Environmental Damage and Its Impact on Business Transactions, 8 CORP. L. REv. 101,
106 (1985).
14. An example of a multi-million dollar liability suit under CERCLA is the Love
Canal situation. There, the government sued Hooker Chemicals & Plastic Corporation
for over $100 million. Private landowners in the vicinity filed suits for over $1 billion.
Hall, The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38 Bus.
LAW. 593, 595 n.ll (1983).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982) imposes liability for "all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the [federal] government or a state not inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan."
16. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
17. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
18. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
19. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
20. Id. § 9607(a). CERCLA's cleanup and liability provisions are triggered by the
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1)(A),
9606(a), 9607(a) (1982).
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tors of hazardous wastes.21
Some courts have suggested that Congress intended that those who
create and profit from businesses dealing with hazardous waste should
be responsible for paying the cleanup costs. 22 The courts, however,
have held even non-negligent actors liable for cleanup costs23 because
they interpret the statute as imposing strict liability.24 Moreover, be-
cause the courts read joint and several liability into the statute,25 a
generator or transporter who produces only a small fraction of the haz-
ardous waste may be liable for the cleanup costs for an entire site.26
To determine whether a transporter or generator 27 is subject to
CERCLA liability, three issues must be considered:
2 8
21. See, eg., NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839; Ohio ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562
F. Supp. 1300, 1302-12 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F. Supp.
1301, 1316-17 (E.D.N.C. 1982), rev'd, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1982); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-41 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
22. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839-40 (construing 126 CoNG. R c. S14,962-63
(1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); S14,966 (remarks of Sen. Stafford); S14,972 (re-
marks of Sen. Tsongas); and 126 CONG. Rtc. H1l,799 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Jef-
fords)). The court stated that Congress wanted to spread the cost of cleanup and
decided that those who had caused or profited from the problem should pay for its
remedy.
See also Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. at 1143 n.10 (suggesting that Superfund
liability be confined to those who engaged in hazardous waste disposal for commercial
profit). See generally Dore, The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Dispo-
sal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 NoTRE DAME LAW. 260 (1981).
23. See NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (court held that CERCLA
applies retroactively to impose liability for response costs on nonnegligent off-site gener-
ator of hexachlorphane; cost computed after CERCLA's effective date).
24. See supra notes 8, 10.
25. See supra note 10.
26. See generally Moore & Kowalski, When Is One Generator Liable for Another's
Waste?, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 93 (1984-85). The authors argue that while some courts
have imposed joint and several liability, the decision to impose this liability is discre-
tionary, not mandatory, under the statute. The authors note that some courts are reluc-
tant to hold small contributors jointly and severally liable for massive cleanup costs. Id.
at 105.
27. For a discussion of ways that a party can argue that he is not a generator, see
Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability, 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 10,224, 10,225-26 (1984) [hereinafter CERCLA Litiga-
tion Update]. Notably, the "generators" are often corporations. Recent cases suggest
that shareholders and officers may not be protected from liability by the corporate veil.
See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
28. See CERCLA Litigation Update, supra note 27, at 10,227-29.
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1. Timing
Transporters and generators are liable for pre-CERCLA acts if they
are connected to current or threatened releases of hazardous
materials. 2
9
2. Standard of Culpability
Though the statute is silent on which liability standard to impose,
courts typically impose strict liability.3 0
3. Causation
The courts find causation when a party sends wastes to a site, when
these wastes were present at the time of a release, and when a release of
hazardous waste occurs.31
C. Owners of Contaminated Property
CERCLA specifically holds all owners of a contaminated site liable
for cleanup costs. 32 Because a majority of courts impose strict liabil-
ity,33 an "innocent" property owner may be held liable for cleanup
costs resulting from illegal or unauthorized hazardous waste dumping.
Courts have discussed the liability associated with two particular types
of "innocent" parties.
1. Owners of Property On Which Illegal Dumping Has Occurred
In City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co. 3 4 the City of Philadel-
29. Id. at 10,227. See also NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839 (court held that liability
applied retroactively); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio
1983) (CERCLA authorizes retroactive liability for transporters).
30. See supra notes 8, 10. See also CERCLA Litigation Update, supra note 27, at
10,228 n.4.
31. See CERCLA Litigation Update, supra note 27, at 10,228-29. See also United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272 (D.S.C. 1984)
(preliminary opinion granting summary judgment).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) states that "the owner and operator of a vessel.., or a
facility [shall be liable for clean up costs]." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) defines "facility" to
include "any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise came to be located."
33. See supra notes 8, 10. See also United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F.
Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (an owner of contaminated property need not have been the
operator).
34. 544 F. Supp. 1135 (1982).
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phia sought to recover costs incurred when cleaning up a city dump
contaminated by the defendant's illegal dumping of hazardous waste.
The defendant argued that the city should be liable as a responsible
party under CERCLA" Although the court did not determine
whether Philadelphia was a responsible party,3 6 it discussed in dicta
the liability of such an "innocent" party. The court noted that if the
entity falls within the technical description of a responsible party but
has little or no connection with the creation of the hazardous condi-
tion, CERCLA liability may be unwarranted.37 The language suggests
that a court should limit liability to parties who engage in substantial
and purposeful hazardous waste disposal activity or who obtain some
commercial benefit from their conduct.3"
The majority of courts, however, have not been lenient in their impo-
sition of strict liability.39 Because the Act specifically states that site
owners are responsible for cleanup costs ° and because courts impose
strict liability,41 an "innocent" owner of property on which illegal or
unauthorized dumping occurred will probably be held liable.4" To
hold a landowner strictly liable for the cleanup cost of any toxic waste
on his property would, however, make him liable for toxic wastes that
are illegally dumped, run off neighbor's property, or inadvertently find
their way on to his property.
35. Stepan argued that because the city owned the dump site, it was a responsible
party under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). It contended that the term "any other person"
as used in § 107(a)(4)(B) did not include a party that is itself subject to liability. The
court rejected Stepan's argument that responsible parties did not have the right to sue
other responsible parties. 544 F. Supp. at 1139-42.
36. Philadelphia did not seriously oppose Stepan's contention that it was a responsi-
ble party. Id. at 1143 n.10.
37. Id. The court quoted an article which argues that CERCLA liability should
only attach to parties who either engage in substantial and purposeful hazardous waste
disposal or profit from their conduct. Id. See Dore, supra note 22, at 276.
38. 544 F. Supp. at 1143 n.10.
39. But cf New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (court
declined to hold liable tenant who had dumped hazardous wastes on the property; land-
lord held liable).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982).
41. See supra notes 8, 10.
42. See Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 13, at 106-07. The authors note that certain
situations such as land trusts in which title to property is held in the name of a trustee
are common. They state that "[c]ommon sense suggests that mere possession of title in
such a situation should not be dispositive as to the question of ownership of the prop-
erty." Id.
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2. Innocent Purchasers of Contaminated Property
In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.4 3 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the question of whether a purchaser of contami-
nated property is liable for the cleanup costs associated with previously
dumped hazardous waste. The court held that to allow the new owners
to avoid CERCLA liability would frustrate the statute's goals.' The
court noted that persons who dump or store hazardous waste often
cannot be located, may be deceased, or may be judgment proof.4 5
Though the defendant in Shore Realty knew of the toxic waste on the
property at the time of purchase,4 6 the court's reasoning suggests that
an "innocent,"' unknowing purchaser would also be liable.4 8
D. Lessors and Lessees
In United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc.
(SCRD1)"9 the district court held both a lessor and a lessee liable for
cleanup costs on contaminated property. In SCRDI the Columbia Or-
ganic Chemical Company (COCC) negotiated a lease of property and
then subleased a tract to South Carolina Recycling and Disposal.50
During COCC's leasehold, SCRDI deposited hazardous substances on
the property.5 The court, imposing liability on COCC as a
43. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 1045.
45. Id.
46. Shore Realty had prepared estimates of the cleanup cost and had unsuccessful-
Ily attempted to obtain a waiver for cleanup cost from the New York Department of
Envrionmental Conservation. Id. at 1038-39.
47. In D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1983), an "innocent"
purchaser of contaminated property tried to obtain a declaratory judgment that a pur-
chaser was not liable for cleanup costs of toxic waste of which he was unaware.
Although sympathetic to plaintiff's position, the court declined to rule because the
question was not ripe.
48. See United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699
(D.S.C. 1984).
49. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984) (preliminary
opinion granting summary judgment against SCRDI, the sublessee), 14 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,895 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 1984).
50. COCC and SCRDI were essentially the same entity. COCC officials incorpo-
rated SCRDI for the purpose of continuing COCC's waste brokering and recycling op-
erations under the auspices of a separate corporation. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
at 20,273. The court's analysis, however, does not treat this fact as significant.
51. Id. at 20,273-74.
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lessee/sublessor,52 stated that "[a]part and distinct from its participa-
tion in the operation of the.., site, COCC, as lessee of the site, main-
tained control over and responsibility for the use of the property and,
essentially, stood in the shoes of the property owners."53 Thus, under
SCRDI* the lessor in a typical lessor-lessee relationship will be liable for
the lessee's contamination of the property. 4
E. Liability of Creditors
CERCLA's imposition of liability on any past or present owner or
operator of a hazardous waste site may extend to secured creditors.5"
The statute, however, defines owner or operator so as to exclude a
"person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security in-
terest in the vessel or facility." '56 The wording of the statute suggests
that any secured creditor who participates in the financial management
of a vessel or facility may be liable for waste release cleanup. Because
secured creditors often participate in the financial affairs of debtors,
this interpretation could emasculate the exception for secured
creditors.
This broad interpretation of "participation in... management" by
creditors was rejected in United States v. Mirabile.7 The district court
distinguished between participation in financial decisions and partici-
pation in operational, production, or waste disposal activities, 8 finding
52. SCRDI, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,897. The court also found
COCC liable for the actions of its corporate officers, id. at 20,897-98, and co-joint ven-
tures, id. at 20,898, and liable as a "person who arranged for disposal or treatment" of
hazardous substances, id., and as a transporter of hazardous substances, id.
53. Id. at 20,897. The court cited other cases in which "owner" was construed to
include leaseholders in the context of condemnation. Id. See Hager v. Devil's Lake
Pub. School Dist., 301 N.W.2d 630 (N.D. 1981); Allen v. Hall County, 156 Ga. App.
629, 275 S.E.2d 713 (1980); Elliott v. Joseph, 351 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1961).
54. See also United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994
(E.D. Pa. 1985).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(g) (1982).
56. Id. § 9601(20)(A). A party seeking to fall within this exemption has the burden
of proving it is so entitled. Cf United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366
(1967) (Bank Merger Act of 1966); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (Robin-
son-Patman Act); SEC v. American Int'l Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 341, 347 (D.
Md. 1961) (Securities Act of 1933).
57. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
58. Id. at 20,995.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/14
1987] EXPANDING LIABILITY AND DIMINISHING DEFENSES 297
the former too attenuated.59 The court concluded that actual partici-
pation in operational, production, or waste disposal activities was nec-
essary to impose liability.' The court, however, limited this
distinction to secured creditors of businesses who dispose of hazardous
waste as a result of operations, 61 noting that a different test might ap-
ply to creditors of entities whose sole business is waste disposal.62
Two commentators suggest that when a lender becomes involved in
the management of the property, as in a bankruptcy workout or credi-
tor in possession situation, the creditor may become liable for
cleanup. 63 In United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust 6 the court
found a bank that held a mortgage on some property and then later
purchased the property at a foreclosure sale65 liable for cleanup costs.
The court held that the secured creditors exception does not apply to
former mortgagees who purchase the property before cleanup costs are
incurred. 66
59. Id. at 20,995 ("mere financial ability to control waste disposal practices ... is
not... sufficient for the imposition of liability").
60. Id. The court noted that Congress had this distinction in mind when enacting
CERCLA. "In the case of a facility, an 'operator' is defined to be a person who is
carrying out operational functions for the owner.... ." Id. at 20,995-96 (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6160, 6182.
61. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996 n.5.
62. Id.
63. Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 13, at 101, 111-12. The authors also point out
that creditors may lose their status through state environmental laws that place "super
liens" on property that contains toxic waste. Id. at 106-08. See generally Note, Priority
Lien Statutes: The States' Answer to Bankrupt Hazadous Waste Generators, 31 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 373 (1987).
64. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
65. Id. at 577. Maryland Bank & Trust held a mortgage on the site beginning on
December 16, 1980. Id. at 575. It instituted foreclosure proceedings in 1981 and
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale on May 15, 1982. Id. The EPA cleanup
took place in 1983. Id.
66. Id. at 579. The court reserved judgment on the liability of a creditor who
purchases property at a foreclosure sale and then promptly resells it. See also Mirabile,
15 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996 (holding that a former mortgagee who
purchased property at a foreclosure sale and assigned it four months later was exempt
from liability); In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1547 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1985) (court suggested in dictum that if the bank had repossessed its collat-
eral in a toxic waste dump it would have qualified for the exemption).
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F. Liability of Corporations and Those Within A Corporation
1. Successor or Merged Corporations
In addition to incurring liability for activities such as generating haz-
ardous waste,67 transporting hazardous waste,68 or purchasing contam-
inated property,69 a corporation may incur liability for other activities.
The EPA argues that a corporation assumes the environmental liabili-
ties of a corporation with which it merges.7" The EPA also contends
that liability should be imposed on a successor corporation in an asset
purchase.71 One commentator maintains that successor liability is a
better method than joint and several liability for insuring that liability
is imposed on the enterprise. 72 He claims that successor liability inter-
nalizes costs within the particular type of manufacturing enterprise
rather than within the industry as a whole.73
2. Corporate Officials
Courts recently extended liability to officers of corporations that in-
cur CERCLA liability.74 In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceu-
tical and Chemical Co. (NEPA4CCO) 75 the court found both the
president and vice president of a corporation jointly and severally liable
for the cleanup costs at a hazardous waste site.76 The corporation,
under the president and vice president's direction, engaged in manufac-
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1)(A), 9606(a), 9607(a) (1982).
68. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
69. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
70. Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 13, at 109 n.2 (citing Memorandum from
Courtney M. Price, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations for Aban-
doned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 12 (June 13, 1984)).
71. Id. But see United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 132 (E.D. Miss. 1985) (a
successor corporation is generally not liable for the former corporation's debts and
liabilities).
72. See Comment, Successor Corporate Liability for Improper Disposal of Hazardous
Waste, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. Rxv. 909, 921 (1985).
73. Id.
74. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v. Carolawn
Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L: Inst.) 20,699 (D.S.C. 1984).
75. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
76. Id. at 849.
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turing processes of which dioxin was a byproduct.7 7 The president and
vice president authorized the burial of eighty-five 55-gallon drums of
toxic waste in trenches on a farm. 78 The United States brought an
action against the chemical company and the two corporate officers for
the cleanup cost at the site.79 The court rejected the argument that
corporate officers are not normally liable for acts of the corporate en-
tity.8" Responding to defendant's claims that as corporate officers they
neither owned nor possessed the hazardous waste involved,81 the court
declared that section 107(a)(3) does not require that an individual actu-
ally own or possess the hazardous waste to be subject to liability,82 but
requires only that the person arrange for the disposal of the hazardous
waste.83 The court then proceeded to give "person" a broad definition
to include both an officer and the corporation. 84
The court further implied that liability would be imposed on any
person owning an interest in or participating in the management of a
corporation that disposes hazardous wastes.85 The court reached this
result based on its determination that Congress intended persons who
bore the fruits of hazardous waste to also bear the cleanup costs.86
77. Id. at 828.
78. Id. at 830.
79. Id. at 826.
80. Id. at 847.
81. Id.
82. Id. Section 107(a)(3) states in pertinent part:
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter to transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, and any facility owned or operated by another party or entity and contain-
ing such hazardous substances....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982).
83. 579 F. Supp. at 847.
84. Id. at 848. The court analogized from the case of Apex Oil Co. v. United States,
530 F.2d 1291, 1293 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976), in which the
court construed § 31 1(b)(5), (6) of the Water Pollution Control Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1321(b)(5), (6). The Eighth Circuit held that "person in charge" could include both
the individual employee and the corporation. 530 F.2d at 1294.
85. 579 F. Supp. at 848 & n.29. See also United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,699, 20,700 (1984) (corporate officials who participate in
hazardous waste disposal activities are subject to individual liability); Dewitt Truck
Brokers v. Ray Fleming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976) (rejecting corporate
officers' contention that government could not pierce the corporate veil).
86. Id. at 848. See also State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312
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3. Shareholder Liability
The EPA contends that a shareholder comes within the statutory
definition of "owner and operator" and should therefore be held re-
sponsible for a corporation's CERCLA liability.87 In United States v.
NEPA CCO the court found a major shareholder who also actively par-
ticipated in management to be an "owner and operator" within the
Act's definition.88 Under NEPACCO, therefore, the court may pierce
the corporate veil to subject shareholders to CERCLA liability.89
III. THE DEFENDANT'S POTENTIAL LIABILITY
A. Statutory Overview
When enacting CERCLA, Congress intended to hold those parties
responsible for inadequate hazardous waste disposal liable for the costs
associated with removal or remedial action.90 Consequently, CER-
CLA's provisions specifically hold defendants liable for incurred "re-
sponse costs." 91 Three parties are allowed to collect incurred response
costs from responsible defendants: government entities,92 private par-
ties,93 and trustees of public lands.9a Reimbursement for removal or
(N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Waste Indus., 556 F. Supp. 1301, 1316 (E.D.N.C.
1982), rev'd, 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
87. Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 13, at 110.
88. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 848. The court continued: "[flrom the language of
the statute either an owner or operator or both can be held liable. In some circum-
stances these parties may be the same or separate and distinct persons." Id. at 848 n.29.
89. See also Carolawn, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,700; Shore Realty,
759 F.2d at 1052. In Angelo & Bergeson, supra note 13, at 110, the authors suggest
subjecting shareholders to liability because of ownership or management involvement as
a liability basis different than piercing the corporate veil.
90. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
91. The statute states that persons associated with a facility:
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence
of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) or any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(C) (1982).
92. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
93. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
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remedial action, however, is conditioned on consistency with the Na-
tional Contingency Plan.95
B. Action by the Federal or State Government
Under section 107(a)(4)(A) a federal or state governmental entity
may sue parties responsible for inadequate toxic waste disposal96 to
recover incurred response costs. Controversy arises in defining recov-
erable costs,97 interpreting the requirement that costs be incurred
before suit is filed,9' and determining whether the response is consis-
tent with the National Contingency Plan.99
94. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
95. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B). See infra notes 118-124, 132-39 and accompanying
texts.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
97. The Act defines resonse costs as expenditures for removal or remedial action.
Id. § 9607(a)(4). See infra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 113-17 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text. Preliminary requirements to a
section 107(a)(4) action include the release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous sub-
stance. CERCLA defines a release as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emit-
ting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into
the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982). A hazardous substance is defined as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section
9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.
6921]; (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 33; (E) any haz-
ardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7412],
and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to
which the [EPA] has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 15.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982). A reportable quantity is defined by reference to quantities
established under the Clean Water Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 117 (1986).
Defendants often challenge whether the waste emitted is a controllable hazardous
substance. In United States v. A. & F. Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. InI. 1984),
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) contended that a by-product of its caustic
etching solution was not a hazardous material within the terms of § 9601(14). The
court concluded that although the caustic etching was occasionally resold for industrial
purposes, it constituted a waste for purposes of CERCLA under 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(b)(2) because MDC occasionally paid to dispose the caustic etching. Id. at 844.
A hazardous substance is categorized as waste if it
(1) Is discarded or being accumulated, stored or physically, chemically, or biolog-
ically treated prior to being discarded; or (2) Has served its original intended pur-
pose and sometimes is discarded; or (3) Is a manufacturing or mining by-product
and sometimes is discarded.
40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b) (1986).
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1. Definition of Response Costs
Under CERCLA, government agencies can recover costs associated
with the removal of, or remedial action to neutralize, toxic waste.
CERCLA defines removali °° and remedial... action to include the
costs incurred in recovering land and neutralizing toxic waste.' 0 2
Although recovery of direct removal and remedial costs is clear, the
right to recover peripheral expenses is not settled. Peripheral expenses
include investigation and monitoring costs, legal fees, and interest ex-
penses. One court characterized peripheral expenses as reimburseable
response costs. In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chemical Co. "03 the district court enumerated basic principles for the
government's recovery of response costs. Initially, the court observed
that the government's recovery rights, based on the statutory language,
should be broadly construed."m Accordingly, the court held that attor-
100. Section 101(23) states:
"[R]emove" or "removal" means the clean up or removal of released hazardous
substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the
event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such
actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1982).
Removal action also includes any emergency assistance such as temporary housing,
alternative water supplies, and security fencing outlined under the Disaster Relief Act
of 1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 5121-5202 (1982).
101. Section 101(24) defines remedial actions as:
actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to re-
moval actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous
substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial danger to present or
future public health or welfare of the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1982).
102. See supra note 100-01.
103. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
104. Id. at 850. The court stated that the recovery provisions apply against "any
other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b)
of the section." Id. (citing § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982)). In support of this
position, the court quoted § 104(b), which states:
Whenever the president is authorized to act pursuant to subsection (a) of this sec-
tion ... [he] may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engineering,
architectural, and other statutes or investigation as he may deem necessary or ap-
propriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof and to
enforce the provisions of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 9604(b) (1982).
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ney's fees' °5 and monitoring and assessment costs10 6 are recoverable
costs. Exercising its discretionary power, the court also awarded pre-
judgment interest, stating that the award furthered the legislative in-
tent of imposing broad liability on responsible parties. 0 7
2. Incurrence of Response Costs
Defendants often argue, and the courts generally agree,' 08 that the
government must first incur expenses before initiating a CERCLA
cause of action." In defense, respondents argue that recoveries
against co-defendants adequately compensate the government for in-
curred cleanup costs.110 In addition, respondents state that no new
and separable cost is incurred. In reviewing the respondents' argu-
ment, one federal district court applied the excess recovery of response
costs to estimated future response costs."1' The court also held that
defendants' payments in related motions are not applicable to response
costs. 112
105. 579 F. Supp. at 851. The court concluded that § 104(b) entitled the govern-
ment to recovery of all litigation costs, including attorney fees. Id.
106. Id. at 851-52. The court concluded that § 104(b) also allowed recovery of
monitoring, assessment, and evaluative activities, including the salaries and expenses of
personnel involved in these activities. Id.
107. Id. at 852. CERCLA does not address prejudgment interest. Id. In terms of
precedent, prejudgment interest is awarded at the discretion of the court to further the
intent of Congress. The award of prejudgment interest, however, is a recovery and not a
punitive measure. See Bricklayers' Pension Trust Fund v. Taiariol, 671 F.2d 988 (6th
Cir. 1982). Prejudgment interest is often awarded in environmental actions. United
States v. M/V Zoe Colocotroni, 602 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Hollywood
Marine, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (prejudgment interest of 9% was
awarded from the date the amended complaint was filed until the date of settlement).
Procedurally, the NEPACCO court also found that the federal government was not
required to file a claim with Superfund or enter a cooperative agreement with the State
of Missouri prior to taking action against the defendant. 579 F. Supp. at 850.
108. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio
1983); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
109. This argument is based on the statutory language of § 107(a)(4)(A). Section
(a)(4) requires the incurrence of response costs. Section (a)(4)(A) provides for reim-
bursement of "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982). This construction serves CERCLA's broad purposes by al-
lowing recovery of incurred costs before the cleanup process is completed. United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1335-36 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
110. See Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1335-36.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1336. Although the court recognized a potential problem with double
recoveries, it felt that the application of funds to future potential response costs ade-
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Defendants also argue that the government must prove causation1 13
between defendant's action and the response costs incurred. In United
States v. Wade 114 the district court concluded that the government met
its burden of proof when the defendant dumped wastes at a particular
site and later testing revealed traces of the same hazardous waste at the
site.1 15 The court based its broad construction of causation on an anal-
ysis of CERCLA's legislative history, particularly on evidence that the
House and Senate systematicaly lessened the causation requirement
with each draft.116 The court concluded that its broad construction of
causation best served the legislative intent. 17
3. Consistency with the National Contingency Plan
Section 107(a)(4)(A) clearly states that costs associated with a gov-
ernment cleanup are recoverable if the action is not inconsistent with
the National Contingency Plan. 18 A question arises, however, in
characterizing the consistency requirements as an affirmative defense
or as an element of the cause of action.119 One federal district court
quately solved this problem. Id. at 1336-37. In a related issue, the courts have held that
to recover incurred costs, the state and federal governments are not required to enter
into a cooperative agreement. Either entity or both may file suit. Id. at 1336; Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. at 1315.
113. CERCLA makes no reference to a standard of proof for causation. Most cau-
sation arguments are based on traditional common law concepts of proximate cause.
See Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1331-32.
114. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
115. Id. at 1334.
116. Id. at 1333. The court stated:
Stripping away the excess language, the statute appears to impose liability on a
generator who has (1) disposed of its hazardous substances (2) at a facility which
now contains hazardous substances of the sort disposed of by the generator (3) if
there is a release of that or some other type of hazardous substance (4) which
causes the incurrence of response costs.... The only required nexus between the
defendant and the site is that the defendant have dumped his waste there and that
the hazadous substance found in the defendant's waste are also found at the site.
Id.
117. Id. at 1334. The court pointed out that the defendant relied on a House report
relating to a bill hearing no real resemblance to the bill the House actually passed. Id.
The court concluded that the statute clearly places liability on "those who have dis-
posed of hazardous substances at the site if hazardous substances of that sort are present
at the site." Id.
118. Seesupra note 91.
119. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1315 (court declined to decide this issue, stating
that the contours of the recently revised natural contingency plan are unclear).
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described the consistency requirement as an affirmative defense, plac-
ing the burden of pleading and proof on the defendant.120 In United
States v. NEPACCO 121 the court based this conclusion on statutory
language requiring action "not inconsistent" with the National Contin-
gency Plan. 22 The court interpreted the statute as creating a presump-
tion that government cleanup costs are reasonable and recoverable.
123
A defendant can, however, rebut the presumption by proving that the
government's cleanup action is inconsistent with the National Contin-
gency Plan.12 4
C. Action by Private Parties
Under section 107(a)(4)(B) a private party can sue responsible per-
sons for inadequate toxic waste disposal. 125 According to the statute, a
defendant is potentially liable for necessary costs incurred in response
to the toxic waste hazard. 126 The issues concerning liability parallel
those under section 107(a)(4)(A) concerning government action.
1. Definition and Incurrence of Response Costs
Plaintiffs in a section 107(a)(4)(B) action may recover necessary, in-
curred response costs.127 The statute does not provide a definition of
120. United States v. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court stated:
As long as the actions taken by the government were in harmony with the national
contingency plan, the costs incurred pursuant to those actions are presumed to be
reasonable and therefore recoverable. If Congress had intended otherwise, they
would have merely stated in section 107(a)(4)(A) "all reasonable costs," instead of
the present language of "all costs."
Id.
124. Id. at 850. The court stated:
To give meaning to every term in the statute, the Court reads the insertion of the
word "not" immediately prior to "inconsistent" to mean that the defendants are
presumed liable for all response costs incurred unless they can overcome this pre-
sumption by presenting evidence of inconsistency.
Id. (emphasis in original).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982).
126. Id. CERCLA is oriented to assist government entities in hazardous waste
cleanups. As a result, the statute and legislative history do not clearly define the ele-
ments of a private cause of action. Analysis of case law is therefore essential to define
the cause of action.
127. Id.
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"necessary," leaving the courts to define the term's parameters. Unfor-
tunately, few courts have addressed response costs in private party
CERCLA suits. Uncertain of section 107(a)(4)(B)'s parameters, fed-
eral district courts disagree on the extent of necessary response cost
reimbursement. 128 The courts, however, recognize that cost recovery
under section 107(a)(4)(B) is narrower than the recovery mechanisms
of section 107(a)(4)(A). 129
Despite uncertainty concerning what constitutes a recoverable cost,
the federal district courts agree that a private party plaintiff must incur
response costs prior to filing a suit under section 107(a)(4)(B)."'3
Claimants, however, need only plead the incurrence of costs, not spe-
cific descriptions of costs."'
3. Consistency with the National Contingency Plan
Private parties may seek reimbursement for remedial action costs
from either the responsible party or the Superfund. Section
107(a)(4)(B) states that remedial action taken by a private party plain-
tiff must be consistent with the National Contingency Plan. 3 2 Despite
the apparent clarity of the consistency requirement, court interpreta-
tions vary dramatically. If the reimbursement is sought from the
Superfund, the private cleanup must meet the consistency requirement.
If, however, the private party seeks reimbursement from a responsible
party, circuits differ on whether consistency is required.
Courts requiring consistency 133 support their position with a policy
argument. They maintain that government standards set out in the
128. See, ag., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 298 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) (investigatory costs are recoverable in private suits); D'Imperio v. United States,
575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983) (investigatory costs are not recoverable in a private
suit).
129. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 850-51.
130. Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (for standing to
sue, claimants must incur cleanup expenses, but need not complete the toxic waste
cleanup); DImperio, 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983) (incurrence of response costs trig-
gers a cause of action).
131. General Elea Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (allegations of general
expenses without a particularized cost schedule are sufficient); Inmont Corp., 584 F.
Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (although allegations of specific costs are helpful, plead-
ings lacking specified costs are permissible as a matter of law).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982).
133. Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348
(D. Del. 1985); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D.
Fla. 1984); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
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National Contingency Plan provide adequate guidelines for economi-
cal, efficient cleanup. 134 Courts that do not require consistency 135 ar-
gue that the financial burden of assessing plans should not be placed on
the government when it is not a party to the action. 136 Furthermore,
these courts claim that because the ultimate determination of what
constitutes fair response costs is subject to question throughout the liti-
gation, the consistency requirement is meaningless.1
37
Despite these two schools of thought, most courts hold that the con-
sistency issue does not provide grounds for dismissal.13 The underly-
ing theory of these holdings is that the consistency requirement relates
to the issue of damages and is not sufficient to block a claim.
1 39
D. Action by Trustees of Natural Resources
Public lands held by both the federal and state governments com-
prise a significant percent of total land in the United States. 14° The
trustees of federal and state lands are responsible for the preservation
of natural resources on public lands. 141 Under CERCLA, federal and
state public land trustees may sue parties responsible for injury to, de-
struction of, or loss of' 42 natural resources 143 for the amount needed to
134. See, eg., Bulk Distrib. Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1446.
135. Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1531 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Pinole
Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
Homart Dev. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1357 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
136. See, e.g., Fishel, 617 F. Supp. at 1535.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (consistency issue is not determinable on the pleadings); Dedham Water Co.
v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1983) (disposition of a
"consistency" issue must await the full development of the record).
139. See, eg., Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (consis-
tency with the national contingency plan relates to the recoverability of damages, not to
the existence of a claim for relief).
140. In 1983 the federal government owned 732 million acres of land. In the same
year, the state, local, and municipal governments owned 1.54 billion acres of land. Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 193, Table 330 (105th ed. 1985).
141. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982) (the President and state-appointed officials are
the respective trustees of federal and state natural resources).
142. See id. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1982).
143. Id. § 9601(16). Natural resources are defined as: "land, fish, wildlife, biota,
air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging
19871
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"restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the equivalent of" 1" the impaired
natural resources.145
Liability for damages to natural resources is dependent on the
method of damages assessment. Official evaluation methods do not
currently exist.146 Section 301(c) of CERCLA requires the President
and designated federal agencies to promulgate rules for assessing natu-
ral resource damages.147 The EPA was assigned responsibility for de-
veloping specific damage procedures, and the Department of the
Interior was given authority to establish damage assessment
methods. 148
to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United
States... any State or local government, or any foreign government."
144. 42 U.S.C. 9607(f) (1982). The Department of Interior defines the extent of
liability for impaired natural resources as the lesser of (1) restoration or replacement
costs, or (2) a diminution of use values. See infira notes 146-70 and accompanying text.
145. In order to establish a prima facie case, trustees need only describe harm to
natural resources in pleadings. Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983). A final determination of damages after liability is ascertained
requires a specific assessment method. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1120 (D. Minn. 1982). An affirmative defense to damages to natural
resources exists if the damages occurred pursuant to a permit or license, an environmen-
tal impact statement, or a comparable environmental analysis. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)
(1982). The intervening acts of God, war, and third parties are also affirmative de-
fenses. Id. § 9607(b).
146. Courts have refused, however, to dismiss cases because of the unavailability of
official assessment methods for natural resource damages. In United States v. Reilly
Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982), the district court held that
promulgation of final damages assessment rules is not a prerequisite to recovery actions.
Id. at 1119-20. In support of its holding, the court stated that the legislative history did
not express an intent to render natural resources damage claims a nullity until the pro-
mulgation of final damage assessment rules. Id. Subsequent cases recognize the viability
of natural resources claims despite the lack of final damages assessment rules. See, e.g.,
New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1984). See also
Newlon, Defining the Appropriate Scope of Superfund Natural Resource Damage
Claims: How Great an Expansion of Liability, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 197 (1985)
(discussing theoretical approaches to quantifying damages to natural resources).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1982). Section 301(c)(1) requires the President, acting
through federal agencies, to promulgate rules regarding both standardized monitoring
assessments (Type A regulations) and detailed, individualized assessments (Type B reg-
ulations). Id.
148. The powers vested in the President under § 301(c) were delegated to the De-
partment of Interior. Executive Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981). The
same Executive Order vested the EPA with the executive powers authorized by
§§ 101(24), 104(a)-(b), and 105. Id.
When the EPA and the Department of the Interior failed to produce guidelines in a
timely manner, a New Jersey district court compelled consent to a publication timeta-
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The Department of the Interior proposed Type A regulations 149 to
provide a simplified, accelerated method of quantifying injuries to nat-
ural resources when the toxic waste release is relatively insubstan-
tial.13° Based on data collected regarding the toxic waste release, a
computer model calculates expected damages."' Because the model is
based on statistical averages, the ultimate Type A damage determina-
tion may not directly reflect the actual harm suffered.152 Defendants,
therefore, can request a specific quantification of damages under the
proposed Type B regulations. 1
53
Type B regulations provided for individualized, in-depth assessment
of natural resource damages.154 The proposed rules outline a uniform
system for determining the extent of damages to natural resources.
Although not yet adopted, the proposed rules provide insight into the
Department of the Interior's position on the natural damages issue.
Analysis of harm under Type B regulations entails three phases: ver-
ification, quantification, and damage determination. 5 5 Initially, the
proposed Type B regulations require verification of an injury to natural
resources.' 56 The definition of injury is twofold. First, an incremental,
measurable adverse change in the chemical or physical quality or via-
bility of a natural resource must be ascertained. 57 Second, proof of
ble. New Jersey v. Ruckelshaus, No. 84-1668, slip op. (D.N.J. 1984). In the consent
decree, the Department agreed to propose "Type A regulations" before April 5, 1986
and to promulgate final "Type A regulations" before August 7, 1986. Id.
149. 51 Fed. Reg. 16,636 (1986) (proposed May 5, 1986). The proposed Type A
regulations apply only to coastal and marine natural resource injuries. Id. at 16,636-37.
150. Id. at 16,642 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § ll.33(a)(1)(iv)-(ix)). The quantifi-
cation method of the Type A regulation is applicable when the release was of a short
duration, constituted a single event, and resulted mainly in the mortality of wildlife. Id.
151. Id. at 16,636.
152. Id. at 16,637.
153. Id. at 16,642 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.33(a)(2)(i)). If a request is made
that quantification of injuries be made under Type B regulations, the potentially respon-
sible party must agree in advance to bear responsibility for assessment costs. Id.
154. 50 Fed. Reg. 52,126 (1985) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (proposed De-
cember 20, 1985). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 34,768 (1984) (summarizing the commentary
received and soliciting additional comments).
155. 50 Fed. Reg. 52,155 (1985) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.60(b)).
156. Id. (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.61) (proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
157. Id. at 52,149 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(v)) (proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
The regulation also provides definitions of injury in terms of specific resources. Id. at
52,155-58 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.62).
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actual"5 8 or hypothesized 159 causation between the toxic waste release
and the injured natural resource is required.
Injury to natural resources under the Type B regulations is quanti-
fied through a comparison with a "base line."16 The injury is mea-
sured by the difference between the "services"' 61 provided by both the
baseline and the current condition of the damaged natural resource.162
The increment measured by this difference includes deterioration in
both human'63 and nonhuman 164 services.
Information provided in the verification and quantification phases
assists in determining damages. Under Type B regulations trustees of
natural resources are entitled damages equal to the lesser of (1) restora-
tion or replacement costs or (2) diminution of use values. 165 Restora-
tion and replacement damages are measured by the costs incurred in
158. The presence of the hazardous substances in sufficient concentrations in the
pathway analysis provides adequate proof of actual causation. Id. at 52,159 (to be codi-
fied at 43 C.F.R. § 11.63(a)(2)) (proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
159. A model demonstrating that conditions existed in a route that could have
served as a pathway provides adequate proof of hypothesized causation. Id.
160. Id. at 52,149 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e)) (proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
The baseline is defined as "the condition or conditions that would have existed at the
assessment area had the discharge of oil or release of a hazardous substance not oc-
curred." Id. Determination of the baseline is not limited to the status of resouces prior
to the discharge or release. The definition of the baseline includes human (change in-
land use) and natural (ecological succession) changes in the condition of natural re-
sources in establishing the baseline. The proposed rule also considers normal variation
in the recovery abilities of natural resources. Id. at 52,139-40.
161. Id. at 52,150 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § l1.14(nn)) (proposed Dec. 20,
1985). Services are defined as "physical and biological functions performed by the re-
source including the human uses of those functions. These services are the result of the
physical, chemical, or biological quality of the resource." Id.
162. Id. at 52,163 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § l1.70(a)(1)) (proposed Dec. 20,
1985). The ability of the natural resource to recover from the injury is considered when
measuring incremental injury. Id. at 52,168-9 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.73)
(proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
163. Injuries to human services include harm to drinking water and the recreational
value of natural resources. Id. at 52,138.
164. Injuries to non-human services include harm to animal habitats and food
chains. Id.
165. Id. at 52,154 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(a)) (proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
An exception to the valuation of damages method is made for special resources that are
worthy of protection but have relatively low use or restoration values. The threshold
determination for special resources status is whether the resource is specifically desig-
nated for protection by a legislative body. A damage determination for special re-
sources considers three factors: (1) the statutory responsibility to manage or protect the
injured resource; (2) the demonstration that the costs of restoration will not be grossly
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reinstating the impaired natural resource baseline. 166 These costs,
however, must represent the most cost effective means of restoring or
replacing the lost natural resource. 167 If damages are measured by the
diminution of use values, defendants are liable for losses to the general
public because of the discharge or release.'
68
Adoption of the proposed Type B rules forecloses options and in-
creases the defendant's burden of proof. First, by limiting the methods
of natural resource damage valuation to restoration cost, replacement
cost, or a diminution of use values, the proposed rules eliminate other
valuation methods that may produce a lower damage award for plain-
tiffs. 169 Second, because the damage assessment method establishes a
rebuttable presumption as to its accuracy, the proposed rules signifi-
cantly increase the burden of proof placed on a defendant to defeat or
lessen a damages award.170
IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
A. Statute of Limitations
Presentation of CERCLA claims must be timely. CERCLA con-
tains two statute of limitations provisions. First, section 112(d) 17 ' re-
disproportionate to the benefits gained by restoration; and (3) the technical feasibility of
the restoration. Id. (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1 1.35(d)(2)).
166. Id. at 52,169 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.81) (proposed Dec. 20, 1985).
Restoration or replacement measures are defined as "those actions that restore or re-
place the resource services to no more than its baseline." Id.
167. The proposed rules require consideration of alternative methods of restoration
and replacement of natural resources. Id. (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 1l.81(d)(1)).
Alternative plans are analyzed in terms of cost effectiveness. The most efficient alterna-
tive is adopted. Id. (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.81(f)(1)).
168. Id. at 52,170 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(1)). A diminution of use
value is measured by the decrease in services provided to humans. Id. If a competitive
market exists for the service, the service value is reflected in the market price. Id. at
52,171 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c)). If no competitive market for the service
exists, the service's value is measured by alternative methods. Id. (to be codified at 43
C.F.R. § 11.83(d)).
169. Id. at 52,171 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)). The proposed regulation
eliminates awards based on negotiations between the parties and the actual or imputed
market value or the organism or resource lost. Id.
170. Id. at 52,172 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(c)). Defendants can rebut the
presumption by defeating the legitimacy of the assessment by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. See also Menefe, Recovery for Natural Resources Damages Under
Superfund: The Rule of Rebuttable Presumption, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
15,057 (1982).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (1982).
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quires commencement of a claim "within three years from the date of
the discovery of the loss." '172 Second, section 112(a)173 requires that
the claimant seek compensation from the responsible party sixty days
before the claim's presentation in court.174 CERCLA clearly defines as
untimely those causes of action brought three years after either the loss
discovery date or CERCLA's enactment date.175 Interpretations of the
sixty day notice rule, however, vary among the judicial circuits. First,
several federal district courts hold that a sixty day notice to the respon-
sible party is a condition precedent to a cost recovery action. 176 Courts
rely on both the plain language of the statute177 and judicial effi-
ciency 178 to support this position. Other district courts, however, hold
that the sixty day notice provision applies only to actions seeking reim-
bursement from the Superfund. 179 These courts base this opinion on
172. Id. The provision specifically states that "[n]o claim may be presented, nor
may an action be commenced for damages under this subchapter, unless that claim is
presented or the action commenced within three years from the date of the discovery of
the loss or December 11, 1980 [the date of CERCLA's enactment], whichever is later."
Id.
173. Id. § 9612(a).
174. Id. This provision, § 112, is commonly referred to as the sixty day notice rule.
The section provides:
All claims which may be asserted against the Fund pursuant to section 9611 of this
title shall be presented in the first instance to the owner, operator, or guarantor of
the vessel or facility from which a hazardous substance has been released, if known
to the claimant, and to any other person known to the claimant who may be liable
under section 9607 of this title. In any case where the claim has not been satisfied
within sixty days of presentation in accordance with this subsection, the claimant
may elect to commence an action in court against such owner, operator, guarantor,
or other person or to present a claim to the Fund for payment.
Id.
175. Id. Case law interpreting § 112 addresses ministerial problems. See, e.g., Idaho
v. Howmet Turbine Component Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Idaho 1986) (if the last
day of the filing period is Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period runs until the
end of the next day that is not Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday).
176. See, e.g., Idaho v. Howmet Turbine Component Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1274 (D.
Idaho 1986); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Fla.
1984); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515 (D.
Mass. 1983); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
177. See, e.g., Howmet Turbine, 627 F. Supp. at 1279.
178. See, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Centers, 589 F. Supp. at 1449 (the sixty day rule applies
to all claims in order to promote joint settlement efforts).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D.
Mo. 1985); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 822 (D. Col. 1985); New York v.
General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291 (N.D. N.Y. 1984).
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statutory interpretation"a° and judicial operating procedures. '8
B. Intervening Acts
CERCLA is accurately described as a strict liability statute. Strict
liability can be challenged by asserting that intervening acts caused a
hazardous waste release. The statute specifically permits a defendant
to assert that the intervention of an act of God,1 82 an act of war,183 or
the acts or omissions of third parties caused the resulting harm. 8 4 To
assert the "third party" defense, the respondent must prove that he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance and took
precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of any third party
and the consequences thereof." 5 "Due care" requires that the respon-
dent take positive action to insure a safety level commensurate with the
hazard risked by a potential toxic spill. One commentator argues that
the mere execution of a disposal contract, without additional action to
ensure safe transport, does not demonstrate an adequate level of care to
assert the third party defense.
1 6
Judicial interpretations of the third party defense emphasize a nar-
row statutory construction over the development of a clear, conceptual
definition of "third party" or "due care," focusing on whether damages
resulted solely because of a third party's act or omission. In United
States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc. (SCRD) 187 the
district court reviewed this issue with respect to the liability of a land-
owner who rented property to a hazardous waste facility operator who
180. See, eg., General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 300. The court specifically relied
on § 112(a), which states: "All claims which may be asserted against the Fund [the
Superfund] pursuant to section 9611 of this title shall be presented in the first instance
to the owner.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (1982).
181. See, eg., General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 300-01 (the procedural rules of the
circuit embody the principle that neither the notice requirements nor the rule's purpose
of promoting negotiated settlements are jurisdictional oriented).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1) (1982).
183. Id. § 9607(b)(2).
184. Id. § 9607(b)(3). The "third party" defense, also known as the "due care"
defense, is most often asserted.
185. Id.
186. Tripp, Liability Issues in Litigation Under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 52 UMKC L. REv. 364, 381-82 (1984). The
author states that only by proving the performance of precautionary actions consistent
with the hazard posed by the waste does a generator begin to show "due care" as in-
tended by the statute. Id. at 382.
187. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272 (D.S.C. 1984).
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subsequently stored hazardous wastes on the property.18 8 Although
the landlord conceded liability under section 107(a)(2),1 9 he asserted a
third party defense.19 The court, rejecting this defense, stated that the
damages were not caused solely by a third party because the contrac-
tual relationship between the respondent and the responsible party con-
stituted joint action. 191
In United States v. Argent Corporation 19 2 a landlord rented a ware-
house to a tenant, who later disposed of hazardous waste material near
the warehouse.193 The United States filed suit against the tenant and
the landlord to recover cleanup costs.194 In response, the landlord ar-
gued that the third party defense protected him from liability.195 In-
voking the SCRDI rule, the court rejected this defense, stating that the
contractual relationship between the defendant and the responsible
party implied that the toxic spills were not caused solely by the
tenant. 196
Courts continue to require that parties claiming the third party de-
fense prove that the injury was caused by the acts of third parties. In
New York v. Shore Realty Corporation197 the district court addressed a
188. I. at 20,273.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1982). See also supra notes 8, 10, 32-33 and accompa-
nying texts.
190. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,275.
191. Id. ("Because there is no question of the contractual link between the landown-
ers and SCRDI, whose liability is admitted, the landowners cannot under any circum-
stances prove that the release was caused "solely" by a third party which did not share a
contractual relationship with them.").
192. 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984).
193. Id. at 1355.
194. Id.
195. Id at 1356.
196. Id. The court explained that because of the contractual link between the land-
lord and the tenant, the landlord could not claim that the release was caused solely by
the tenant. Thus, the court concluded, the third party defense was, "as a matter of
law," not available for the landlord's use. Id.
The landlord also argued that his mere ownership of the warehouse and surrounding
property, with an attendant connection to Argent Corporation, excluded him from the
class of owners covered under CERCLA. Id. at 1355-56. The court held that the land-
lord was an owner within the CERCLA definition because participation in management
or operations is not required to invoke ownership liability. Id. at 1356. The court fur-
ther noted that CERCLA's legislative history shows a deliberate omission from the Act
of language that would have required participation in management or in operation as a
prerequisite to owner liability. Id.
197. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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new landowner's liability for toxic spill damages caused by a tenant
both before and after the land purchase. 98 Finding that some toxic
leaks occurred subsequent to the new landowner's ownership, the court
held the landowner liable for damages caused by the tenant.1 99 The
court observed that the landowner could reasonably foresee the ten-
ant's continued disposal of hazardous waste on the land, and took no
action to prevent it.2°" Shore Realty's failure to take precautionary
action against foreseeable acts or omissions of third parties led to the
dismissal of its third party defense.2°1
Shore Realty provides interesting insights into the third party de-
fense as applied to land purchases. Under Shore Realty a third party
defense is successful if a new landowner proves that all of the claimed
toxic waste damages occurred prior to his ownership, that no hazard-
ous leaks occurred subsequent to his ownership and operation of the
land, and that no leases exist with tenants who caused or are currently
causing toxic waste damages.20 2
V. CONCLUSION
CERCLA liability has become a hidden trap. Ordinary business and
legal transactions may subject parties to multi-million dollar liabil-
ity.20 3 Furthermore, the Act's few defenses do not always allow blame-
less parties to escape liability.2 ° 4
198. Id. at 1037-39.
199. Id. at 1048.
200. Id. at 1049.
201. Id. The court stated:
Shore was aware of the nature of the tenant's activities before the closing and could
readily have foreseen that they would continue to dump hazardous waste at the
site. In light of the knowledge, we cannot say that the releases and threats of
release resulting of these activities were "caused solely" by the tenants or that
Shore "took precautions against" those "foreseeable acts or omissions."
Id.
202. See also D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248 (D.N.J. 1983). In
D'Imperio plaintiff purchased land unaware of the presence of toxic wastes on the prop-
erty. Upon receiving a letter from the EPA informing him of potential liability for
cleanup costs, plaintiff fied suit seeking a declaratory judgment exonerating his CER-
CLA liability, guaranteeing compensation for any future contributions to cleanup costs,
and renaming the D'Imperio site as it appeared on the National Priorities List.
Although the court expressed sympathy for the plaintiff's position, it dismissed the case
for lack of ripeness. Id. at 254.
203. See supra notes 20-26, 43-73 and accompanying texts.
204. Burying previously contaminated property or acquiring a security interest in
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These results are undesirable for several reasons. First, persons who
did not contribute to the hazardous waste problem may be held liable
under CERCLA.2 °5 The tremendous potential liability for a cleanup
increases costs for certain business transactions 206 and may totally pre-
clude other business transactions.
20 7
To avoid these problems, CERCLA's liability and defense sections
should be amended or construed to hold liable only parties who have
engaged in substantial and purposeful hazardous waste disposal or who
have profited from such conduct. Though this approach was suggested
in City of Philadelphia v. Stephan Chemical Co.,208 courts have not
adopted it, in part because the Act makes equitable approach difficult.
Consequently, Congress should act to limit CERCLA liability hnd ex-
pand the allowable defenses.
Cynthia S. Korhonen
Mark W. Smith
contaminated property may expose a party to CERCLA liability. See supra notes 43-
48, 55-66 and accompanying texts.
205. The owner of property on which hazardous waste has been secretly and ille-
gally dumped could be held liable even though he knew nothing of the event. See supra
notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
206. For example, banks and other financial institutions would be unwise not to
inspect property offered as loan security when even a remote possibility exists that haz-
ardous materials may be present.
207. Parties may be wary of involving themselves with a company engaged in toxic
waste cleanup for fear that an accidental or purposeful release may expose them to
liability.
208. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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